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The bare theory is a no-collapse version of quantum mechanics which predicts
certain puzzling results for the introspective beliefs of human observers of su-
perpositions. The bare theory can be interpreted to claim that an observer can
form false beliefs about the outcome of an experiment which produces a super-
positional result. It is argued that, when careful consideration is given to the
observer’s belief states and their evolution, the observer does not end up with
the beliefs claimed. This result leads to questions about whether there can be
any allure for no-collapse theories as austere as the bare theory.
Introduction
The bare theory is an intriguingly simple Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics which
is explored by Jeff Barrett in The Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Barrett 2020) and The
Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds (Barrett 1999), and by David Albert in Quantum
Mechanics and Experience. (Albert 1992) The idea behind the bare theory is straightforward:
*Forthcoming in Synthese. Please cite the published version.
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“The bare theory is just the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics but without
the collapse dynamics.” (Barrett 2020, p. 145) By removing the collapse postulate from the von
Neumann-Dirac version of quantum mechanics, “...the linear dynamical laws are nonetheless
the complete laws of the evolution of the entire world.” (Albert 1992, p. 123) Quantum me-
chanical states will thus evolve deterministically according to the dynamics of the Schrödinger
equation.
However, when a human observer gets involved – and in particular when that person ob-
serves a superpositional state – the bare theory appears to lead to baffling results. For example,
Barrett maintains that “...the bare theory seeks to explain why one might falsely believe that one
had determinate appearances of the sort predicted by the standard theory,”(Barrett 1999, p. 110,
emphasis Barrett’s), and “If the bare theory were true...an observer would typically believe that
she had an ordinary determinate experience when there would in fact be no such experience that
she believed she had.”1(Barrett 1999, p. 112) As Albert puts it, such an observer “will be rad-
ically deceived even about what her own occurrent mental state is”(Albert 1992, p. 118), and
“Whatever belief [the observer] does end up with ... is necessarily going to be a false belief.”
(Ibid., p. 127) These are claims about belief. In particular, these claims concern the content of
the observer’s introspective state. A careful analysis of the nature of belief within the quantum
mechanical formalism – either the bare theory or the von Neumann-Dirac version – will need to
address the complicated intentional aspects of belief, the contents of belief, and the neural com-
ponents of belief, including its causal roles and vehicles/eigenstates. This paper will begin by
providing such an analysis of belief and introspection in the context of an observer of spin 1/2
outcomes. Next it will apply this analysis to superpositional outcomes in the context of the bare
theory. It will be shown that the observer has no false belief in the form claimed. It will then
be shown that the quantum mechanical property of linearity cannot produce such a result given
1I have replaced “he” with “she” in this quote.
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the fine-grained nature of belief contents, and the time evolution of the belief eigenstates. This
result will be reinforced with an example of a simple spin measurement system. The example
will show how a common output obtained from a superposition lacks the properties required
to count as a misrepresentation about pointer position. This is because such common outputs
lack the fine-grainedness and resolution to represent any pointer positions in the first place.
These results will lead us to question whether there can be any allure for no-collapse theories
as austere as the bare theory.
1. The bare theory, introspection, and superposition
In their discussions of the bare theory, both Albert and Barrett consider the example of a human
observing a superpositional state which has resulted from a Stern-Gerlach measurement. I will
follow Barrett’s notation, as it uses more standard coordinates.2 The example considers an
observer “M” who measures the x-spin of a spin 1/2 system S.3 Call this the M+S system.
Before interacting with the measuring device, the system S is in an eigenstate of z-spin, and
the observer M is in an eigenstate of being ready to measure the x-spin of the system S. Post-
measurement, a superpositional state of the observer M and the spin 1/2 system S, will result
from the linear dynamics of the bare theory. The resulting superposition is given by Barrett’s




|x-spin up〉M |↑x〉S + |x-spin down〉M |↓x〉S
)
, (1)




|↑〉M |↑x〉S + |↓〉M |↓x〉S
)
.
2Albert uses ‘hardness’ to denote spin along the x-axis, and ‘color’ to denote spin along the z-axis. Barrett
uses traditional Cartesian coordinates x, y, and z for the spin directions. I have replaced Albert’s terminology of
“hard” with “up”, and “soft” with “down”, to be consistent with the spin terminology being used in this paper.
3For the purposes of this discussion, we shall consider the spin 1/2 particles to be electrons.
4Barrett’s notation combines observer and measuring apparatus for M , assuming perfect correlation between
the two. (Barrett, 1999) See also the discussion in section 2 below.
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As mentioned above, the bare theory is most puzzling when it is applied to mental states like
beliefs, and so it’s worth underscoring that the observer M is a human observer. In a separate
discussion, Barrett describes an automaton that records spin measurements, where “This model
requires a close correspondence between physical memory configurations and mental states. . . .”
(Barrett 1999, p. 95) But presumably automatons (and models of automatons) do not themselves
exhibit mental states such as beliefs and experiences, and so it is the human mental states that
arise in the observation of a superposition which need explaining, as both Barrett and Albert
themselves recognize. For example, in the first sentence of the section entitled The account of
experience, Barrett asks “So just how far can the bare theory go in explaining our experience?”,
where “our” refers to human experience (1999, p. 110), and later “This is what it feels like
to be” the observer, and that “she will believe” that the pointer indicates a determinate result.
(Barrett 2020, p. 147, Barrett’s emphasis) Albert similarly asks “what it would feel like to be
the experimenter” (Albert 1992, p. 116) and in particular asks the experimenter “whether or
not you have any particular belief” (Albert 1992, p. 118) about the outcome. Albert goes on to
stipulate thatM ’s perceptual eigenstates are belief states withinM ’s brain that track the pointer,
and thus have content, and he explicitly labels these internal states as belief eigenstates, for
example: |believes e up〉M .5 These are not simple descriptions of external behavior, but instead
are descriptions of the internal representational states of a human observer M - internal states
which feel a certain way to her, which have representational contents such as pointer positions,
and which have causal consequences. In other words, these are descriptions of human mental
states, and in particular, belief states.6 (Kim 2010; Dretske 1988; Dretske 1995) We will focus
then, on the details of human mental states such as beliefs when a superposition occurs as a
5Albert 1992, p. 112. See also the discussion in Section 2 and footnote 14, below. Here I have replaced “black”
with “up”, and “h” with “M”.
6As Albert and Barrett’s remarks reveal, what is most fascinating about M observing a superposition is what she
ends up believing about the experiment. And behaviorist approaches to understanding her mental states (including
belief) will invariably end up short, as they leave out the vehicles, contents (e.g., pointer readings) and causal roles
of these mental states.
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result of applying the bare theory.7
Consider now a human observer of an experiment where the outcome is a superposition as
in equation (1). Barrett’s question for the observer M in the state is “Did you get a determinate
result of either x-spin up or x-spin down?” (Barrett 1999, p. 98) Albert also asks the subject
if she has “. . . any particular definite belief. . . about the value of the [spin] of this electron.”
(Albert 1992, p. 118) Note that asking a person to report in this way on the content of a belief
they hold requires introspective access to that belief. One must introspect in order to access
the existent belief, and thus report the content of that belief. Barrett agrees, saying that M
“. . . would believe that she knows what the result is.” (Barrett 1999, p. 98) M ’s belief about
what she knows is an introspective belief, and in this instance,M is being asked to introspect her
perceptual belief/knowledge about the result of the experiment. This introspection is a belief
about a belief.8 And so it is M ’s introspection which is misrepresenting what she is perceiving.
Consider a simple, and non-superpositional, case where M perceives a red apple. We would
say in this situation that M has the occurrent perceptual belief that the apple is red. Such
an occurrent belief would involve M ’s visual cortex. (Zeki 1993; Lee et al. 1998; Seymour
et al. 2016) Were we to now ask M about the color of the apple in front of her, M would
presumably report “The apple is red.” But now let us ask M whether she has a determinate
result for her perceptual belief about the color of the apple before her. M can rightly respond
to this query with “Are you asking me what color the apple is?” to which, following Albert and
Barrett’s prescription, we would answer, “No. We are asking a different question. The question
is, do you now have a determinate perceptual belief about the color of the apple before you?
7Albert and Barrett’s key claim about the bare theory concerns false introspective beliefs attributed to observer
M. Neither author attempts to clarify any distinctions between mental state terms such as ‘experience’ and ‘belief’.
Since their key claim concerns only belief, we will likewise focus on the properties of beliefs when evaluating their
claims about the bare theory, as properties of experience will not weigh on their conclusions.
8As knowledge states are typically taken to be a form of true belief then M ’s belief about her knowledge state is
a belief about a belief; hence, an introspective belief. From here on for consistency we will refer to M ’s perceptual
beliefs of the experimental outcomes as beliefs rather than knowledge.
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Specifically, we are asking you to verify that you have a determinate belief about the color of
the apple - by introspecting your belief about the color of the apple.” In this instance, M will
employ an introspective belief – a belief about a belief – because she will need to inspect her
occurrent beliefs to establish that she indeed has a belief about a red apple before her. As an
introspective belief, this will be a belief with another belief as a content; and specifically, M ’s
occurrent perceptual belief will be the content of M ’s introspective belief.
We should note that in all the cases Albert and Barrett describe, the initial occurrent beliefs
M forms about the device reading are occurrent perceptual beliefs about the device, and that
M is then tasked to introspect those perceptual beliefs. Thus the mental states in question are
perceptual beliefs, and introspections of perceptual beliefs. It is a hallmark of perceptual mental
states that their contents are fine-grained.9 These fine-grained contents ensure that M ’s mental
state – be it a perceptual belief, an introspection of a perceptual state, an experience, etc. –
about (or of) a red apple will always be distinct from her perceptual belief, introspection of a
perceptual belief, or experience about (or of) a green apple. (Tye 1995; Tye 2009; Dretske 1988;
Dretske 1995; Frege 1892; Perry 1977) The same lesson applies when M observes the detec-
tor in her experiment: the fine-grained contents of M ’s mental states ensure that M ’s belief,
introspection, or sensation that the electron has spin up will be distinct from her belief, intro-
spection, or sensation that the electron has spin down.10 This fine-grainedness is fundamental:
a belief about redness has an intentional content that differs from the intentional content of a
belief about greenness. The intentional content of a belief that the needle registers “+1/2” is
distinct from the intentional content of a belief that the needle registers “–1/2”. Beliefs with
different intentional contents will always be distinct from each other. Hence, any type of mental
9We will see that the fine-grainedness of M ’s mental states is enforced in three ways: by results from neu-
roscience and through an observational principle applied by Albert and Barrett (both in Section 2), and by the
property of transparency of mental states (Section 6).
10Where the content in these cases includes, say, the position of a pointer on the measuring device; for example
pointing to one of ‘+’ or ‘−’.
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state with a spin-up content will differ from any mental state with a spin-down content.11 And
importantly, it is the contents of the states that give us the license to call such states mental
representations to begin with. (Brentano, 1874; Dretske 1988; Tye 1995) These contents help
us distinguish one state from another, and in causal theories of mental content, mental states are
individuated through their differences in content, vehicle, and causal role. (Dretske 1988; Kim
2010)
Perception and introspection are also mental states that involve different physical regions
of the brain. Visual perception, as already pointed out, involves visual cortex. Introspection
involves pre-frontal cortex, according to imaging studies. (Fleming et al., 2010) When intro-
spection is being utilized to report an occurrent perceptual belief, the two beliefs – introspective
and perceptual – have distinct neural vehicles located in different regions of the brain. Each
neural vehicle is made up of neurons exhibiting their own set of action potentials during the
introspective/perceptual belief episode. When asking M to report about one of her occurrent
perceptual beliefs, her answer will depend, as we have seen, on the introspective state which
is representing that occurrent perceptual belief. In addition, the intentional content of M ’s in-
trospective state will have a fine-grainedness that tracks the fine-grainedness of the occurrent
perceptual belief it represents.12 (Dretske 1995; Moore 1903; Tye 2009) This means simply that
when asked, ifM is visually perceiving the needle pointing to x-spin up, thenM will introspect
this perception of the needle pointing to x-spin up. If alternatively, M is visually perceiving the
needle pointing to x-spin down, then M will introspect this perception of the needle pointing to
x-spin down.
Returning briefly to the baffling results of the bare theory, the claim is that M “...would
11Note that this difference in content holds whether the content is the position of a pointer towards ‘+’ or ‘−’
or whether the content is actual color content ‘red’ or ‘green.’ The intentional content will be fine-grained in either
case.
12If the representing state did not have this fine-grainedness, then M would not be capable of answering queries
about the content of the perceptual state in question.
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typically believe that she had an ordinary determinate experience when there would in fact be no
such experience...”, and “Whatever belief M does end up with, when (1) obtains, is necessarily
going to be a false belief.” It is this claim of M ’s having a particular false belief that deserves
addressing, since M ’s having this false belief is what makes the theory so baffling in the first
place. Second, sinceM has an introspective belief about an occurrent perceptual belief of a spin
result, then it is M ’s introspective belief about this occurrent perceptual belief which is false.
We will revisit these results below, after first coming to understand the details of M ’s observing
x-spin measurements in both non-superpositional, and superpositional, cases.
2. The non-superpositional case
Let us begin by considering a non-superpositional case where M perceives, and introspects, an
x-spin up result for system S. Representing M ’s introspection of her belief that the electron is
x-spin up will require two eigenstates: one corresponding to her introspective state involving
pre-frontal cortex, and another corresponding to her perceptual belief involving visual cortex.
The state of a non-superpositional system corresponding to M ’s introspection of her perceptual
belief, together with an observed x-spin up system S, can be written:
|Introspect ↑〉M−PF |↑〉M−V C |↑x〉S . (2)
These states represent not just M ’s occurrent perceptual belief about the spin result, |↑〉M−V C ,
but also her introspection of that perceptual belief, |Introspect ↑〉M−PF . Here the subscript
“M−PF ” stands for M ’s introspective state involving neurons in Pre-Frontal cortex and the
subscript “M−V C” stands for M ’s perceptual belief state involving neurons in Visual Cortex.
Similarly, the state of a system corresponding to M ’s introspection of her perception of a
non-superpositional x-spin down result will be:
|Introspect ↓〉M−PF |↓〉M−V C |↓x〉S . (3)
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It is important to note thatM ’s perceptual and introspective beliefs are stipulated to be perfectly
accurate: she “. . . is a perfect observer of the measurement result indicated by the measuring de-
vice and the measuring device is perfect in correlating the position of the pointer that represents
its result with the x-spin of S.” (Barrett 2020, p. 106) This means that “. . . whenever M looks
at a pointer that’s pointing to “up,” she eventually comes to believe that the pointer is pointing
to “up”; and that whenever M looks a pointer that’s pointing to “down,” she eventually comes
to believe that the pointer is pointing to “down” (and so on, in whatever direction the pointer
may be pointing).”13 (Albert 1992, p. 77) Let’s refer to M ’s perfectly accurate observations of
Stern-Gerlach results as the Accuracy Principle.
The Accuracy Principle means that the contents of M ’s beliefs correspond exactly with the
spin of an electron as measured and displayed by the device M is observing. For example,
if a prepared x-spin up electron is passed through a detector aligned to measure spin in the x-
direction, then the electron will emerge in the x-spin up state, causing the arrow on the device to
point to spin up, andM will perceive the arrow on the device pointing to spin up, with the resul-
tant perceptual belief of the measurement as x-spin up. The resultingM+S non-superpositional
system is:
|↑〉M−V C |↑x〉S .
For a prepared x-spin down electron, the resulting M+S non-superpositional system is:
|↓〉M−V C |↓x〉S .
This means there will be specific neurons in visual cortex that will fire when the perceived arrow
points to x-spin up, and that a separate and distinct set of neurons in visual cortex will fire (with
different action potentials) when the perceived arrow points to x-spin down. These two sets of
neurons will differ in location in visual cortex, and will differ in their action potentials. This
13Barrett refers to observer M as “him” which I have changed to “her” in the quote. Albert calls M “Martha”.
I have replaced Albert’s terminology of “hard” with “up”, and “soft” with “down” in this paper.
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accords with experimental results from neuroscience, where single neurons and small groups of
closely clustered neurons in visual cortex have preferences to respond to directional and shape
properties of a perceived object, with different neurons responding to distinct directions and
shapes. For example, directionality bias in single and closely clustered neurons in visual cortex
has been demonstrated with experiments on rhesus monkeys. This bias is fine-grained, with
specific small clusters of neurons being biased for particular, preferred, directions. (Salzman
et al., 1990; Salzman et al., 1992) In experiments on macaque monkeys, single neurons were
found to give selective responses to specific shapes and directions. (Tanaka et al. 2003; Tanifuki
et al. 2001; Dehaene 2009) Again, an eigenstate representation such as |↑〉M−V C captures that
this is a physical state in M ’s brain14 – hence the subscript “M−V C” denoting a specific state
in Visual Cortex – and that this is the state of perceiving x-spin up.
And, when M is introspects this perceptual result of x-spin up, we have:
|Introspect ↑〉M−PF |↑〉M−V C |↑x〉S .
Here, the physical state representation |Introspect ↑〉M−PF captures that this is a physical state
in M ’s brain, hence the subscript “M−PF ” denoting a specific state in M ’s Pre-Frontal Cortex
which is the introspective state of the perception of x-spin up.
Similar results hold mutatis mutandis for an x-spin down electron sent through the detector:
|Introspect ↓〉M−PF |↓〉M−V C |↓x〉S .
We are now in a position to consider the time evolution of the “ready” state of a non-superpositional
system before the measurement to the state after the measurement. Before a measurement of a
14Albert stipulates that M ’s states |↑〉M−V C and |↓〉M−V C are physical perceptual belief eigenstates in M ’s
brain that track the pointer of the measuring device: “...|“up”〉M is that physical state of M ’s brain in which she
believes that the pointer is pointing to the word “up” on the dial. . . and |“down”〉M is that physical state of M ’s
brain in which she believes that the pointer is pointing to the word “down” on the dial.”(Albert; 78) Here I have
replaced Albert’s observer “o” with “M”, and have replaced “hard” with “up” and “soft” with “down”.
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prepared x-spin up electron, the state of the M+S system is:
|PF ready〉M−PF |VC ready〉M−V C |↑x〉S , (4)
where the first state is the ‘ready’ state of M ’s Pre-Frontal cortex, the second state is the ‘ready’
state of M ’s Visual Cortex, and the third state is the (system S) electron prepared in the x-spin
up direction. Since M is a perfect observer of electron spin outcomes, her state evolves after
the measurement into the familiar result (2):
|Introspect ↑〉M−PF |↑〉M−V C |↑x〉S .
The case is similar mutatis mutandis for the time evolution of states for a prepared x-spin down
electron. Before the measurement, the state of the system is:
|PF ready〉M−PF |VC ready〉M−V C |↓x〉S . (5)
And, since M is a perfect observer, her state evolves into the familiar result (3):
|Introspect ↓〉M−PF |↓〉M−V C |↓x〉S .
These non-superpositional results are the same for both the von Neumann-Dirac formulation
and the bare theory. With only a single possible outcome, the collapse postulate gives the same
result as the deterministic Schrödinger equation. In addition, any measurements of observables
for the individual eigenstates within either of these cases will give the same results in both
formulations. So, M perceives x-spin up when an x-spin up electron has been passed through
the device, and x-spin down when an x-spin down electron has been passed through.
These outcomes accord precisely with the fine-grainedness of mental states. We would
expect, given what we know about visual cortex, that a perception of a pointer pointing to
“up” would have a distinct neural vehicle exemplified in visual cortex from the neural vehicle
exemplified in a perception of a pointer pointing to “down”. But we also expect, given the nature
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of belief, that the perceptual content of spin-up will always be distinct from the perceptual
content of spin-down. And because M is a perfect observer of spin results, then the contents
of M ’s perceptions will always be the results displayed on the measuring device, in whatever
form that device is set up to display: “+”, or “–”; “↑”, or “↓”; “up” or “down”, etc. So when
it comes to belief states in non-superpositional cases, both their neural vehicles/eigenstates and
their contents are fine-grained, and track/agree with each other with respect to the spin of the
system, and this result is guaranteed by the Accuracy Principle.
Similarly, if M introspects the an x-spin-up result, then that means that M is perceiving x-
spin up, and is introspecting this result. SinceM is a perfect observer, and because introspective
states are belief eigenstates, then when M introspects a perceptual state of a spin outcome, the
introspective states and their contents will track the spin results. This outcome also accords with
the fine-grainedness of mental states. So an introspection of a perception of spin-up, for example
a pointer pointing to “up”, will have a neural vehicle exemplified in pre-frontal cortex distinct
from the neural vehicle exemplified in pre-frontal cortex of an introspection of a perception of
spin-down. And given the nature of belief, the introspection of a perceptual content of spin-up
will always be distinct from the introspection of a perceptual content of spin-down. So, as with
other belief states, both the neural vehicles and the contents of introspections of perceptions of
spin outcomes are fine-grained, and agree with each other with respect to the spin of the system,
and this result is guaranteed by the Accuracy Principle.
3. Observing a superposition in the bare theory
Now consider the time evolution of M ’s pre-frontal and visual cortex when the system S is in a
superposition. Before measurement, the system S is in an eigenstate of z-spin, and the observer
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M is in an eigenstate of being ready to perceive, and introspect, the result of the measurement:






where the first state is the ‘ready’ state of M ’s Pre-Frontal cortex, the second state is the ‘ready’
state of M ’s Visual Cortex, and the state in brackets is the superposition of x-spin up and x-
spin down (an electron initially in an eigenstate of z-spin expanded in the x-spin basis) for the











|PF ready〉M−PF |VC ready〉M−V C |↑x〉S + |PF ready〉M−PF |VC ready〉M−V C |↓x〉S
]
We recognize that the first component in brackets is the state (4) and the second term is the
state (5) which were introduced earlier. So both these components will evolve according to the
Schrödinger equation as above, and the Accuracy Principle will ensure that the physical and
content properties track each other within each component. The result after the measurement
will be a superposition which we will call |Ψ〉, of the form:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|Introspect ↑〉M−PF |↑〉M−V C |↑x〉S + |Introspect ↓〉M−PF |↓〉M−V C |↓x〉S).
Both components of the superposition have introspective and perceptual eigenstates. As dis-
cussed earlier, these eigenstates each represent distinct neural vehicles and contents. Any mea-
surement of these eigenstates would yield distinct eigenvalues one from the other. Since each
belief eigenstate in the superposition is distinct from the others, and since the eigenstates of
belief are orthonormal, the superposition cannot correspond to any determinate state of belief.
Now we are in a position to note two important things. First, equation (1) does not accurately
describe the state of the system whereM introspects her belief about the measurement outcome.
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Instead, the state of the system will be given by state |Ψ〉, which contains a superposition ofM ’s
introspective eigenstates involving pre-frontal cortex and perceptual belief eigenstates involving
visual cortex. Second, finding a common, measurable eigenvalue for the belief eigenstates in
the superposition |Ψ〉 that M is in post-measurement, appears to be a formidable task, given
that each eigenstate represents distinct physical, and content, properties.
Both Albert and Barrett propose a solution to this difficulty. The solution is to get M to
answer “Yes” to a specific question about her mental state. Albert asks forM to answer whether
she has “. . . any definite belief . . . about the value of the [spin] of this electron.” (Albert 1992,
p. 118) Barrett formulates the question for M as, “Did you get some determinate result to
your x-spin measurement, either x-spin up or x-spin down?” (Barrett 1997, p. 98) And so,
Barrett continues, “M would report that she got a determinate x-spin result when she did not
determinately get up and did not determinately get down.” (Ibid)
By linearity, any answer to this question by M would need to be the same given in a non-
superpositional case. We have seen that each component of |Ψ〉 represents a non-superpositional
case: the first component in |Ψ〉 is state (2) and the second is state (3):
|Introspect ↑〉M−PF |↑〉M−V C |↑x〉S
|Introspect ↓〉M−PF |↓〉M−V C |↓x〉S
When in either state (2) or (3), M will need to introspect her perceptual belief about the result
of the experiment in order to evaluate the question of whether she has perceived x-spin up
or x-spin down. And an evaluation of the question requires access to the particular occurrent
perceptual belief in each case. Since the occurrent perceptual beliefs in either case are distinct
from one another in content (“up” in one component and “down” in the other), then the contents
of the introspections in either case will also be distinct from one another. In the first case, M ’s
introspective evaluation of the perceptual belief that the spin is up would reveal the answer to
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be “up”, whereas in the second case, M ’s introspective evaluation of the perceptual belief that
the spin is down, would reveal the answer to be “down”. Let us designate the distinct contents
of these two evaluative introspective belief states as “UP ∨ DOWN?: UP” and “UP ∨ DOWN?:
DOWN”. M requires intentional contents with values like these in order to answer the question
correctly in either case. And both these cases occur in different components of the superposition
|Ψ〉. Given these considerations, let us say that upon formulating these evaluative introspective
belief eigenstates, M can now answer the question as posed: “Did you get some determinate
result to your x-spin measurement, either x-spin up or x-spin down?”
But note that there is a peculiarity about answering such a question. Spoken answers to ques-
tions are formulated in a different part of the brain: Broca’s area. And Broca’s area is an area of
the brain that is tasked with linguistic output – not with introspection. These linguistic outputs
include unconscious grammatical processing, together with sending the signals required to form
the mouth and tongue in a particular configuration, exhaling breath in a certain manner, opening
and closing the nasal passages, and so forth.(Pinker 1994, 1997) Further, linguistic processing
is unconscious (Pinker 1994; Tononi 2012), whereas introspection is conscious (Dretske 1995;
Moore 1903). Finally, introspection is tasked with producing beliefs about beliefs, and has
the function to indicate the contents of the beliefs being introspected (Dretske, 1995), whereas
Broca’s area is not: it is tasked with producing linguistic outputs. (Pinker 1994, 1997) Since lin-
guistic output states have different neural vehicles, types of contents (unconscious vs conscious)
and functional roles from introspective states, they require different eigenstate representations,
which will be considered in the next section.
The outputs of intentional mental states should not be confused with mental states them-
selves. Consider the simple example of drinking a beer. I believe there’s a six-pack in the fridge
and I desire a beer. These mental states cause me to open the fridge door, grab a bottle, twist
off the cap, and take a drink. The belief and desire are mental states with intentional contents,
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but the reaching, twisting, and drinking are outputs which are caused by these representational
states. These outputs are not themselves representational states: states with intentional contents
from a function to represent properties in the environment, and executive capacities to cause ac-
tion.(Dretske 1988; Papineau 1987) They are instead outputs of representational states: causal
consequences of mental states which do have the executive capacities and intentional contents.
The questions that have been posed, therefore, are designed to detect a common measurable
output of introspective states in theM+S system, and not directly measure the introspective and
perceptual eigenstates themselves. Yet what is at issue is the content of M ’s own introspective
and perceptual beliefs, for the claim is that M has a false introspective belief. We should note
thatM is not being asked in these questions to introspect what spin result she perceived. Indeed,
Albert explicitly commands M not to state what she believes is the actual spin of the electron:
“Don’t tell me whether you believe the electron to be spin up or you believe it to be spin down,
but tell me merely whether or not one of those two is the case.”(Albert, 118) The reason for
this prescription is clear: The eigenvalue for asking M “Do you introspect you are perceiving
spin up?” will be different for both components of the superposition, as it will if we decide
instead to ask M “Do you introspect you are perceiving spin down?”, and so there will be no
common eigenvalue for the superposition |Ψ〉 if either of these questions is asked. So a different
question – a disjunctive one – must be asked (“whether or not one of those two is the case”). But
that means that, rather than measuring the contents of M ’s introspective states directly, we are
instead being asked to measure a common output of those introspections. The focus has been




The problem of shifting the focus in this way can be illustrated by an example. The exam-
ple shows how a single output can also be observed from a superposition involving an x-spin
measuring device. We will see that the eigenstate which produces the single result lacks the
fine-grained contents of other eigenstates in the superposition – the pointer states that represent
fine-grained spin results – even though it is an output of these very states. This will lead us to
reconsider how to interpret M ’s report when including output states in her Broca’s area.
It is worth emphasizing that when an electron-spin measuring device ends up pointing to
‘+’, or pointing to ‘–’, these pointer states are representational states with a fine-grained con-
tent: they are about something, and crucially, they are about whether the measured electron
is spin up or spin down. That’s what makes them representational in a way appropriate for
accurately measuring the spin of a particular electron.
Suppose that the pointer on our electron-spin measuring device starts in a “ready” position
pointing straight up as depicted in figure 1. When an electron is passed through the device, the
pointer either rotates to the left for a spin-down result, or to the right for a spin-up result.
Figure 1: A simple spin-measuring device
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To make the analogy with our human observer clear, call the spin measuring device “M”.





where the first state is the ‘ready’ state of the pointer M -P , and the state in brackets is the
superposition of the x-spin up direction and x-spin down direction (that is, the electron in system
S initially in an eigenstate of z-spin expanded in the x-spin basis) for the prepared electron.
The result after the measurement will be a superpositional state we will call |Φ〉:
|Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉M−P |↑x〉S + |↓〉M−P |↓x〉S)
Now let us attach a circuit to the measuring device M , as shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Measuring device M with circuit, ready to measure a spin
When the needle comes to rest, pointing to either spin direction, it closes the circuit shown,
causing a flow of current which turns on a lightbulb, as shown in figures 3 and 4 below.
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Figure 3: A measurement of x-spin down.
Figure 4: A measurement of x-spin up.





where |ready〉M−L and |ready〉M−P are the ready eigenstates of the measuring device M . The
result after the measurement will have the lightbulb M -L now being on, represented by the
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|“On”〉M−L |↑〉M−P |↑x〉S + |“On”〉M−L |↓〉M−P |↓x〉S
)
.
Call the light intensity when the lightbulb goes on from the completed circuit, λ. Then we can
see, by linearity, that a measurement of this lightbulb output by an operator O is an observable
property of the superpositional state as well as an observable of each component of the super-
position. So, by putting an electron in an eigenstate of z-spin through an x-spin detector, we
can measure this observable property λ:
















λ |“On”〉M−L |↑〉M−P |↑x〉S + λ |“On”〉M−L |↓〉M−P |↓x〉S
)
= λ |Φ′〉 .
Thus it is possible to observe a single value, λ, from the superposition |Φ′〉. But notice that
measuring a lightbulb output like this does not mean that the device M is falsely representing
the spin outcome in some way. It just means that the lightbulb emits a light flash regardless of
whether there has been a collapse to one component of the superposition |Φ′〉 or the other (as in
the von Neumann/Dirac formulation), or whether, if Everett is correct, this observable will be
measurable even in a superposition, as a consequence of linearity. As Albert points out:
. . . it follows from the linearity of the operators that represent observables of quantum-
mechanical systems. . . that if any observable O of any quantum-mechanical sys-
tem S has some particular determinate value in the State |A〉S , and if O also has
that same determinate value in some other state |B〉S , then O will necessarily also
have precisely that same determinate value in any linear superposition of those two
states. (Albert 1992, p. 117)
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A measurement of lightbulb output λ not only does not, but cannot, represent any final position
of the pointer, and hence the spin of the electron. If you are looking at the lightbulb for that
fine-grained content, you are looking in the wrong place. The lightbulb can never represent
this fine-grained content, as it does not have the resolution of the pointer. It has no “+” or
“–” markings, no “↑” and “↓” markings, and no way of representing spin directions in the
first place. As Dretske has put it, the lightbulb doesn’t have the “function to indicate” such
contents. (Dretske 1988; Dretske 1995) No measurement of the lightbulb can produce such
a fine-grained output, just as no operator can operate on the lightbulb |“On”〉M−L eigenstate
and produce “+” or “–” eigenvalues. The lightbulb is blind to these fine-grained contents, and
simply cannot represent them. And if it can’t represent these outputs, it can’t mis-represent
them either. (Dretske 1988; Dretske 1995) The lightbulb, in short, cannot falsely represent spin
directions, as it has no capability to represent them in the first place.
5. Linearity and belief
The lightbulb/detector example is not a perfect analogue of the puzzling case presented by
the observer M , because M has introspective states, whereas the lightbulb/detector system
presumably does not; but we will see shortly that it is nevertheless instructive. To begin, recall
that Albert and Barrett ask M to introspect her perceptual belief, and that the false belief she
is claimed to end up with is an introspection, since M “...would believe that she knows what
the result is.” Again, M ’s belief about what she knows is an introspective belief. To see the
difference between M ’s case and the lightbulb/detector, consider once more the case where M
is in a non-superpositional state. In this situation, when M perceives a particular spin outcome,
say “+”, she will introspect that she is perceiving “+”:
|Introspect ↑〉M−PF |↑〉M−V C |↑x〉S ,
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and as we have seen, this is the result expected from the Accuracy Principle and the neuro-
science of perception. But this result also occurs because of the transparency of mental states,
which will be discussed here and in the following section. Briefly put, introspective states track
and reveal the content of the occurrent perception which is being introspected. Introspective
states have the function to indicate the contents of the states being introspected. (Dretske 1995)
No additional features of the perceptual state are revealed in introspections of perceptual con-
tents; the perception is transparent, yielding its perceptual content to introspection. (Moore
1903, Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Tye 2000, Tye 2009) This is why, when M introspects her ob-
servation of spin up, “+”, she introspects the content “+”. This of course makes sense when
we are asked, as M is, what the content of an occurrent perceptual belief is. The introspection
provides the content for answering that question, and it does it by checking the content of the
occurrent perceptual belief.
This situation does not occur for our simple lightbulb/detector, as we can see by considering
this system in a non-superpositional state, such as when the detector detects the single spin
outcome “+”. This situation is depicted as:
|“On”〉M−L |↑〉M−P |↑x〉S
Suppose we now ‘ask’ the system to introspect the result of its perception of the spin of the elec-
tron. What could serve as the introspective state? The electron state |↑x〉S is what is perceived,
so it will not do. The pointer state |↑〉M−P plays the role of the occurrent perceptual state, as
it displays the electron spin result.15 This leaves us with the lightbulb state, |“On”〉M−L. But
the lightbulb being “On” cannot be a state of introspecting the pointer position “+”, for several
15The pointer state cannot serve an an introspective state for another reason: introspective states are not iden-
tical with the states they introspect. As Dretske explains, when addressing the notion of ‘introspective’ states of
instruments, ”We can see the instrument’s pointer positions. It cannot.” (Dretske, 1995, p. 48) See his chapter 2,
“Introspection,” for why instruments and gauges can’t introspect their own readings.(Ibid) We have already seen
an example of this, for humans at least: introspective states are located in a different region of the brain from
perceptual states.
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reasons. First, as discussed in the previous section, the lightbulb cannot represent the content
of the pointer, as it does not have the resolution of the pointer; it lacks the fine-grainedness of
an introspective state tracking an occurrent perceptual state. It has no “+” or “–” markings, no
“↑” and “↓” markings, and no way of representing spin directions whatsoever. Second, as just
discussed, an introspective state will track and reveal only the intentional content of the occur-
rent perceptual state being introspected.16 But here the contents of the two states are completely
different: the pointer content is “+”, whereas the lightbulb’s content is “On”. Additionally, if
the pointer instead pointed to “–”, the lightbulb’s content wouldn’t change at all - it would again
have the content “On”. These are not cases of introspection, since not only does the presumed
introspective state of the lightbulb not track and reveal the content of the state being ‘intro-
spected,’ but its content doesn’t even change when the content of the state being introspected
does! The reasons for these failures were given in the previous section: the lightbulb is blind
to the fine-grained contents of the pointer state and does not have the function to indicate them,
and so cannot represent or misrepresent them. The lightbulb state is instead an output of the
pointer’s states, and it altogether lacks the intentional properties required to be an introspective
- or analogue-introspective - state.
And now we can recognize the same situation of an output state lacking the intentional
properties of an introspection with the human observer M . Recall that M answers a question
using Broca’s area. When we consider the linguistic output state in Broca’s area, then before
the measurement the “ready” state of the M − S system is:
|B ready〉M−B |PF ready〉M−PF |VC ready〉M−V C [
1√
2
(|↑x〉S + |↓x〉S)], (6)
where the first state is the ‘ready’ state ofM ’s Broca’s Area, and the rest of the ‘ready’ states are
defined as before: M ’s pre-frontal cortex, her visual cortex, the ‘ready’ state of the measuring
16In “...bringing to bear your faculty of introspection...you are not aware of any inner object or thing. The only
objects of which you are aware are the external ones making up the scene before your eyes.” (Tye 2000, pp. 46-47)
See also Dretske (1995), Moore (1905), and Tye (1995) and (2009).
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device, and the final state is the superposition of up and down spin for the electron that is about
to be passed through the detector. And as before, M ’s eigenstates are designated by subscripts
‘M−B’, ‘M−PF ’ and ‘M−V C’.
After the measurement, this state evolves into a superposition of the form |Ψ′〉, which is dif-
ferent from the superposition |Ψ〉 we considered earlier, and now includes the output eigenstate




|“Yes”〉M−B |Introspect ↑〉M−PF |↑〉M−V C |↑x〉S
+ |“Yes”〉M−B |Introspect ↓〉M−PF |↓〉M−V C |↓x〉S
)
.
Then we can see, by linearity, that a measurement ofM ’s linguistic output will be an observable
property of the superpositional state as well as of each component of the superposition. That
is, when the superposition |Ψ′〉, which includes M ’s eigenstates, is asked whether M has some
definite belief in the way prescribed earlier, where this question is represented by the operator
O, then she will answer “Yes”:
O |Ψ′〉 = “Yes” |Ψ′〉 .
And this result is by virtue of this operator O operating on M ’s state |“Yes”〉M−B.
But this is like the detector example above. ‘Measuring’ an answer like this – an output
of an introspective state – does not mean that M ’s introspection is false. It just means that
M produces an output “Yes” regardless of whether she has collapsed to one component of the
superposition or the other, or that, if Everett is correct, this answer will be measurable even in
a superposition (by virtue of linearity). As was the case for the spin detector above, a measure-
ment of an output “Yes” does not convey the content of any of M ’s introspective eigenstates
or occurrent perceptual belief eigenstates about the spin of the electron; those states have very
different contents, as we have seen. Indeed, M ’s belief eigenstates have not changed at all from
superposition |Ψ〉 to superposition |Ψ′〉. This is explicitly spelled out in the state vector |Ψ′〉,
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which containsM ’s four belief eigenstates: |Introspect ↑〉M−PF , |↑〉M−V C , |Introspect ↓〉M−PF ,
and |↓〉M−V C . Measurement of a non-belief eigenstate of M like |“Yes”〉M−B does not mean
M ’s introspection eigenstates are misrepresentations, as these are separate eigenstates with their
own associated operator (which commutes with the operator “O”) and eigenvalues. In addition,
the contents of the belief eigenstates remain fine-grained with their contents determined (and
unchanged) due to the Accuracy Principle. Recall from Section 3 that M ’s introspective evalu-
ation of the question requires – due to the Accuracy Principle – that the content of any of M ’s
introspective states will contain either an “up” or a “down” component. So when we consider
the claim that M “would believe that she knows what the result is” (Barrett 1999, p. 98) based
on this spoken output, and that this belief is “false” (Ibid.), we see that there is no basis for
this claim, as M does not actually have the belief. That is, there is no single belief state that
emerges from, or can be factored out of the superposition with the singular content spin-up or
spin-down. Further, the spoken answer is not a belief state, and in particular it is not an intro-
spective state as required by the bare theory, and so it has no intentional content. So M has no
false introspection. There is instead a common linguistic output which occurs regardless of the
quantum mechanical interpretation.
Bub, Clifton and Monton (1998) came to a similar conclusion regarding M ’s introspec-
tive states. They recognized that M ’s introspective states (what they call M ’s ‘reflecting’, or
‘believing that she believes’) would indeed differ in each component of the superposition, by
tracking the perceptual belief’s content in the same component:
But if the bare theory is true, we can also ask what it will predict when M attempts
to reflect upon what belief about e-spin she has. Since M would then get into
a superposition of believing that she believes up and believing that she believes
down. . . under the bare theory she will be unable to specify which of the two beliefs
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she takes herself to hold.17 (Bub et al. 1998, p. 42)
Though Bub et al. recognized this problem, they did not press the argument further, instead
opting to criticize the bare theory on other grounds, including the inability of the bare theory to
account for the ordinary beliefs that observers come to have about measurements.18 This paper,
in contrast, argues that Bub et al. should have continued the argument, for the two reasons
given above. First, an utterance of “Yes” by M is an output of belief eigenstates, and so does
not qualify as a belief; and second, due to the Accuracy Principle, no remaining belief eigenstate
of M has a singular content that could possibly allow that state to serve as the required false
belief.
In addition, it is important to recognize that within each component of the superposition
|Ψ′〉 involving M , there are only two belief eigenstates: an introspective belief eigenstate and
a perceptual belief eigenstate. These are M ’s only candidates for a false belief. However,
due to the Accuracy Principle, none of these belief eigenstates could serve as instances of a
false belief about tracked spin direction within that component. So M ’s belief eigenstates about
pointer position considered individually – perceptual and introspective – are accurately tracking
the spin direction within that component.
Further, none of M ’s belief eigenstates can be factored out of the superposition |Ψ′〉. If any
could, we would have a candidate for a single belief state for M that might serve as the required
false belief. Perhaps such a state would look something like |Ψ′〉 = |D〉 |Ψ′′〉, where |D〉 is
the factored-out eigenstate which is the false belief state, and |Ψ′′〉 contains the superpositional
‘residue’, if you will, of |Ψ′〉. But none of the four existing belief eigenstates within the su-
perposition |Ψ′〉 – namely, |Introspect ↑〉M−PF , |↑〉M−V C , |Introspect ↓〉M−PF , and |↓〉M−V C –
can be factored out of the superposition. So none of these eigenstates can serve as the single
17Bub refers to his subject as “Eve.” “Eve” is replaced with “M” here.
18See also Barrett (1998) for more on Bub et al.’s arguments against the bare theory.
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belief for M which could be considered to be the false belief |D〉. This means any false belief
about the outcome for the superpositional case must be at the level of speech output; that is, at
the level of M saying “Yes” about introspecting a definite belief about the spin of the electron.
But speech output, as we have shown, is not an introspective state, and indeed, being an output
rather than an intentional state, it is not a belief of any kind about the spin of the electron, and
so it cannot be the claimed false belief.
Finally, we should also note that since knowledge is generally taken to be some form of jus-
tified true belief, then M cannot have any sort of knowledge of the outcome of the experiment,
either. This potentially undermines a separate claim of Albert’s that when observing a superpo-
sition “...M “effectively knows” what spin of the electron is.”19 (Albert 1992, p. 120) We should
note that Albert prefaces this claim with “Let’s make up a name for all that...” (Ibid.), so it’s not
completely clear how to interpret M’s ‘knowledge’ here. However, if ‘effective knowledge’ is
somehow claimed to be some kind of knowledge, this claim cannot be correct for two reasons:
(1) the ‘knowledge’ attributed to M in this instance is actually a false belief, and as such, can
not be any form of knowledge, and (2) we have now seen that when in a superposition, M ends
up without a single belief of any kind about the spin of the electron, and so could not have
knowledge about the spin. If an agent such as M has no knowledge, Albert’s later development
of what he calls ‘self-measurement’ may not work for the bare theory. The reason is that the
notion of self measurement for the bare theory requires that an observer like M effectively knows
the spin of the electron when the outcome is a superposition (Ibid, p. 183). Since as we have
seen, M can have no knowledge whatsoever about the spin in such circumstances (and even
according to Albert will actually have a false belief), M will lack any knowledge in the process
of self-measurement.20
19Here I use M for h and “spin” for “color”.
20See Albert and Putnam (1995), and Monton (1998), for further discussion of self-measurement in no-collapse
theories. Note that the no-collapse theories they consider (modal theories, for example) all require that “something
extra needs to be added” to the quantum state description in order for this self-measurement to occur.(Albert and
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6. Disjunctive Experiences
Another peculiar aspect when considering bare theory is the nature of what might be called
disjunctive experiences. Here,
...a proponent of the bare theory . . . would not say that M would determinately be-
lieve that she had recorded x-spin up, nor would she say that she would believe that
she had recorded x-spin down; rather, she would say that M would determinately
believe that she had recorded x-spin up or x-spin down. One might call the experi-
ence leading to this disjunctive belief a disjunctive experience.21 (Barrett 1999, pp.
110-111)
There are three issues to consider here. First, it is not clear what could serve asM ’s determinate
belief in this instance. In analyzing the superpositional state |Ψ′〉 of the M+S system, the
only available belief eigenstates (either introspective or perceptual) are always distinct from
one another, and reside in the separate components of the superposition. Further, as we have
seen, none of these eigenstates can be factored out of the superposition |Ψ′〉 to serve as M ’s
determinate belief that she had recorded x-spin up or x-spin down. So there is no single belief
state (such as the belief |D〉 considered above) formed with a disjunctive content like that just
proposed.
Second,M ’s perceptual and introspective beliefs are fine-grained. Recall that the false belief
in question is an introspective belief, and so M must be introspecting this disjunctive content.
Given the fine-grainedness of belief, an introspective belief with the content “x-spin up or x-
spin down” is distinct from an introspective belief with the content “x-spin up”, and both of
Putnam 1992, p. 18; Monton 1998, p. 308) The notion of adding something to get an outcome is antithetical to the
bare theory, which instead strips quantum mechanics down only to its basic postulates (minus even the collapse
postulate), and adds nothing else whatsoever. Since nothing is added to the bare theory (such as the value states of
modal theories), the self-measurement issues raised by these other accounts will not occur for an observer in the
bare theory.
21I have substituted “she” for “he” in this quote.
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these are distinct from an introspective belief with the content “x-spin down”.22 The Accuracy
Principle insures that the content of any introspective belief in either component of the superpo-
sition tracks the content of the perceptual belief eigenstate in that component, which itself tracks
the electron spin in that component. Further, these eigenstate relations within each component
have evolved deterministically from the Schrödinger equation. Indeed, even the ‘disjunctive’
introspective contents considered earlier contain contents – “UP” in one component of the su-
perposition and “DOWN” on the other component – [(UP ∨DOWN?: UP) and (UP ∨DOWN?:
DOWN)] – which confirm which component of the superposition they reside in, so they are not
unresolved disjunctions like the one given in the quote above. So, asking M the content of her
introspective eigenstate would yield the fine-grained contents “UP ∨DOWN?: UP” in one com-
ponent of |Ψ′〉 and “UP ∨ DOWN?: DOWN” in the other component of |Ψ′〉. Thus, querying
M ’s introspective eigenstates when she is pondering the disjunctive question will not produce
a single measurable output. If this belief content is to somehow emerge from a superposition,
then linearity requires that this content appear as the introspective content in both components
of the superposition. But the fine-grainedness of the contents of the eigenstates in both compo-
nents of the superposition, as governed by the Accuracy Principle, does not allow there to be a
common content for the introspective states.
Which leads immediately into the third issue. As G.E. Moore painstakingly showed over
a century ago, introspective and perceptual mental states are transparent. That is, when one
introspects a perception, one’s awareness is of the content of the perceptual state introspected,
not the perceptual state itself. Thus any introspective states are drawn to the contents of the state
being introspected: introspection reveals no further content than the content of the perceptual
state being introspected. (Moore 1903, Dretske 1995, Tye 1995) The belief eigenstates in both
components of the superposition contain contents specific to that component (“+” or “–”), but
22Each of these introspective beliefs would have a distinct vehicle (eigenstate), content, and causal role. See
Dretske (1988) and (1995), and Kim (2010).
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never a content of a disjunctive belief with a content of the pure form “x-spin up or x-spin
down.” The common output that is provided is not the content of an introspective, or any other
belief state; it remains a common output of introspective states which themselves have different
contents. No mechanism has been provided by the bare theorist to show that an introspective
belief with the required content has been formed. In order to do this, the bare theorist would
need to explicate the vehicle, content, and causal role (including its origin) for such a belief
state. And that is a tall order that I don’t believe the bare theorist has yet provided, because
neither component of the superposition contains, nor could produce, such a disjunctive content.
Instead, by the Accuracy Principle and by transparency, each introspective and belief content
perfectly tracks the pointer result in its component.
7. Concluding the bare theory
According to Albert and Barrett, the bare theory is worth examining because it is the simplest
no-collapse theory, and as such, its characteristics will be shared at some level by all other no-
collapse theories. Its simplicity also makes the bare theory a good place to start in understanding
what features might need to be modified or added to achieve an acceptable no-collapse theory.
Albert even calls the bare theory “an amazingly cool idea”, and an intriguing way to interpret
Everett’s theory: “...this” he says, “is the idea that it strikes me as interesting to read into
Everett’s paper.” (Albert 1999, p. 124)
However, the bare theory’s simplicity also leads to glaring problems, which Albert and Bar-
rett themselves recognize.23 For starters, how could any pure states required for measuring, and
observing, an electron’s spin, as represented in equation (6), ever even occur given the evolu-
tion of states according the bare theory? Nearby objects would not be limited to maintaining
any single trajectory a discreet distance (say) from the experiment, but instead, given the linear
23See Albert (1992), Barrett (1999), and also Bub, Clifton and Monton (1998).
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dynamics, would evolve into having a superposition of momenta, some of which would re-
sult in these objects becoming entangled with the states of the observer, the measuring device,
and the electron in the experiment. Even more worrisome, the past histories of the observer,
measuring device, and electron, and objects in their vicinity would surely have already created
many more such entanglements, complicating matters drastically. The picture the bare theory
provides us, therefore, is one of escalating entanglement of nearby objects, which cascades over
time to a morass of entangled states which make any hope of conducting an experiment with a
determinate outcome futile.
But the difficulties do not stop there. Implementing the bare theory would call into question
the very nature of observation and belief, leading one to ask how an observer such as M could
ever come to be in a determinate perceptual state of observing the detector in the first place, or
introspecting that result, or even reporting on its status. Applying the bare theory apparently
yields a world without determinate beliefs and reports, leaving no room for sentient beings as
we understand them: beings like us.
In addition, we have seen that claims of the bare theory regarding the beliefs of an observer
of a superposition fall short. To begin, when the observer M answers “Yes” to a question about
her perceptual beliefs of the measurement, it does not follow that M would therefore falsely
believe that she knows what the result of the measurement is. One reason is that M does not ac-
tually have the introspective belief in question; M has no single introspective state that emerges
from the superposition with a singular content, including a disjunctive content. For such a
single content to emerge from a superposition without such a common belief, linearity would
require that the introspective states in both components of the superposition have the same con-
tents; but both the Accuracy Principle and transparency instead insure that each introspective
eigenstate has a distinct fine-grained content, which precludes the required single-content re-
sult from occurring in both components of a superposition. In addition, M ’s spoken utterances
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originate from output states in Broca’s area, which is dedicated to unconscious linguistic pro-
cessing, not to producing conscious introspections or occurrent perceptions, or indeed any kind
of belief. These utterances are outputs of belief states, and not beliefs themselves, and so can-
not be false beliefs, since they cannot be intentional in the ways that beliefs are known to be.
This phenomenon of producing a common output from a superposition, which lacks the fine-
grainedness of the representational states composing the superposition, was shown to also be
possible in other systems via the example of a spin detector. This example shows that when a
common output can be elicited from a spin detector in a superpositional state, the output lacks
the intentional properties required for a misrepresentation about pointer position.
With all these difficulties, what characteristic, aside from its simplicity, makes the bare the-
ory worth considering? As we have seen in this paper, it is the claim by Albert and Barrett that,
under the bare theory, observers of superpositions will have false beliefs about their own men-
tal states, and so have “. . . the illusion of a perfectly ordinary, fully determinate measurement
result when there isn’t one.” (Barrett 2020, p. 148) The promise of observers with false beliefs
about their own observations of experiments is indeed fascinating and potentially instructive for
no-collapse theories. But there are two problems with this claim as we have now seen. First, it
is highly improbable that M , the measuring device, and the electron would start in a pure state
like equation (6) without already being entangled with other objects in their vicinity, or even
if such a pure state did obtain, that the state could evolve to a superposition like |Ψ′〉 without
being entangled with other nearby objects. But second, even if the experiment did somehow
evolve as advertised, a careful analysis of the belief states of the observer under the bare theory
shows that M lacks the alleged introspective state altogether, and so she lacks the false belief
as claimed. This result leaves the bare theory much less interesting. The promise of observers
with false beliefs about their own observations of experiments has been removed, leaving a bare
theory that is arguably even more implausible than before.
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